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Lack of Meaningful Choice Defined:
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I. INTRODUCTION
Employees today face a challenging job market, at best. According
to Alan Greenspan, "[N]early 2 million of our workforce have been un-
employed for more than a year."' Couple unemployment rates with a
slow economic recovery,2 add in slow job growth,3 rising benefit costs, 4
increases in outsourcing and offshoring,5 and a job market emerges
wholly unlike the relative boom of the 1990s. Employers have replaced
less than a tenth of the jobs cut since 2001 and have reigned in wage
growth. 6 Some workers are even losing their employment battle to ro-
bots.7 Employers receive piles of resumes and applications for each
opening and are able to hire overqualified workers who have been unable
* J.D. Candidate 2005, Seattle University School of Law; B.A. Western Washington University. I
would like to thank the members of the Seattle University Law Review for their hard work and sup-
port over the last two years, on this article and on our many other endeavors together. For helping
me begin this journey, and for still being here as this stage draws to an end, my love and thanks go to
Chris Prince and our family of friends and relatives. This Comment is dedicated to Ken Prince and
Bob Lingafelter, whose contributions to my life will never be forgotten.
1. Daniel McGinn, Help Not Wanted; Jobs: Where Did They Go? Offshoring's a Problem, But
There's a Bigger Culprit, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 2004, at 31.
2. Kathleen Lynn, More Tough Sledding for Job Seekers, Health Care and Education Are
Among Growth Areas, THE RECORD, Feb. 8, 2004, at Special Section.
3. Id.
4. Jon E. Hilsenrath, Wages Remained Under Pressure in Fourth Quarter, WALL ST. J., Jan.
30, 2004, at A2.
5. McGinn, supra note 1.
6. Hilsenrath, supra note 4.
7. James M. Pethokoukis, Meet Your New Coworker, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 15,
2004, at ee2-ee5 (noting that a $40,000 robot does not require an employer to pay health care costs).
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to find work elsewhere. Those lucky enough to be employed have fewer
coworkers but are expected to output the same amount of work, and yet
real hourly wages are falling. 8 It is, as they would say in real estate, a
buyer's market. Companies hold all the cards and employees feel lucky
to not be drawing on dwindling unemployment benefits. In this employ-
ment landscape, the employer has a larger than usual bargaining advan-
tage when it comes to the terms of an employment contract. The em-
ployer can decide on the terms of employment, and if an employee or
prospect is not willing to sign on the dotted line, one of the country's
many long-term unemployed would be happy to do so.
One such term that confronts new and existing employees is per-
haps unfamiliar: a mandatory arbitration clause. 9 The parties agree to this
clause prior to the time any dispute arises, indicating prospective agree-
ment to arbitrate any claims that may arise between them. Mandatory
arbitration in this context must be distinguished from post-dispute or
voluntary arbitration, in which the parties may elect, after a dispute
arises, to settle the dispute through binding or non-binding arbitration.
Since the United State Supreme Court decided Circuit City v. Ad-
ams, which made it clear that arbitration clauses should be enforced in
employment contracts, academics and judges have argued over the fair-
ness of this decision.10 This Comment contributes to the ongoing argu-
8. David Moberg, Jobs NOT Well Done; Employment Issues May Make or Break Campaigns,
IN THESE TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at 22.
9. The language of such clauses can be confusing, and contributes to the ambiguity of the statu-
tory and case law in this area. While most existing statutes refer to "arbitration," e.g., Civil Rights
Act of 1991 § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), it is not clear if legislators intended to include all of the
various methods of agreeing to arbitration, ranging from mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration to post-
dispute voluntary arbitration, without an inquiry into the specific legislative history.
Most frequently, this type of clause is called a "mandatory" or "compulsory" arbitration clause.
See, e.g., Lucy T. France & Timothy C. Kelly, Mandatory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims in the
Workplace: No Enforceability Without Equivalency, 64 MONT. L. REV. 449, 450 (2003); see also
Kelly Burton Beam, Administering Last Rites to Employee Rights: Arbitration Enforcement and
Employment Law in the Twenty-First Century, 40 Hous. L. REV. 499, 501 (2003). The dictionary
defines "compulsory arbitration" as arbitration that is "required by law or forced by law on the par-
ties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (7th ed. 1999) (implying that the "forcing" comes from out-
side of the relationship between the two parties). This Comment focuses on situations where the
force was unilateral, upon the employee, by the employer, and therefore uses the term "mandatory
arbitration" to mean mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. For another commentator's take on the lan-
guage, see Mara Kent, "Forced" vs. Compulsory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims, 23 LAW &
INEQ. 95, 98-100 (2005).
10. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Mandatory Arbitration: Forward, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1,
2 (2004) (stating, in introduction to a symposium issue on the topic, "[i]t is hard to escape the con-
clusion that the large majority of academic experts on dispute resolution have serious and significant
doubts about the wisdom of the Supreme Court's strongly pro-arbitration stance. Many of the arti-
cles in this Symposium reflect this deep-felt concern that the Supreme Court has guided us down the
wrong track .... "); Matthew T. Bodie, Questions About the Efficiency of Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 39 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004); Laura Kaplan Plourde, Analysis ofCircuit City Stores, Inc.
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ment that mandatory arbitration agreements should not be enforced in the
employment context for federal statutory claims and highlights possible
defenses to such contracts for employee plaintiffs.
Mandatory arbitration agreements subvert an employee's constitu-
tional right to a judicial forum and generally place unfair burdens on
plaintiffs. An employee faced with the option of either signing a manda-
tory arbitration agreement or losing a job often has no meaningful
choice. The Supreme Court, however, has failed to recognize first that
Congress did not intend for mandatory arbitration to extend to Title VII
claims and second, that employers often leave employees with no mean-
ingful choice regarding mandatory arbitration. Nonetheless, state and
federal judges are increasingly recognizing that arbitration agreements
may be the product of procedural unconscionability. Accordingly, when
employees are forced to sign mandatory arbitration agreements and ex-
press reservations about being forced to do so, courts examine the doc-
trine of procedural unconscionability to determine whether such agree-
ments are enforceable.
Part II of this Comment provides some background on the problems
employees face with respect to mandatory arbitration agreements. Part III
introduces relevant federal statutes, the Federal Arbitration Act, and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Part IV looks at the intersection of
arbitration and employee Title VII claims in federal courts, paying par-
ticular attention to the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. Part V examines these courts' repeated misinterpretations of con-
gressional intent and the legislative attempts to remedy the problem, and
argues that employee plaintiffs should scrutinize recent state court deci-
sions that have found arbitration agreements substantively and proce-
durally unconscionable for potential assistance in defending against the
enforcement of arbitration clauses. Part VI concludes with the recom-
mendations that courts should reexamine Congress' intent with respect to
mandatory arbitration clauses and scrutinize the enforcement of such
clauses under the state law doctrine of unconscionability.
II: UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM
Imagine this scenario:1" After a long, arduous, and stress-filled in-
terview process, a college graduate receives an offer to work as a teller at
v. Adams in Light of Previous Supreme Court Decisions: An Inconsistent Interpretation of the Scope
and Exemption Provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 7 J. SMALL & EMERG[NG BUS. L. 145, 174
(2003); Nicole Karas, EEOC v. Luce and the Mandatory Arbitration Agreement, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
67, 102-104 (2003).
11. Other than the use of a based-on-true arbitration clause, see infra note 12, this scenario is
completely fictional.
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a regional bank. She begins working at the bank, and after a few months
of positive performance reviews, she is feeling good about her decision
to accept the job.
After her first year, she is called into the human resources office
and handed a piece of paper titled "Arbitration Agreement." The human
resources manager explains that she has to sign the form and return it
before her next shift. The teller scans the paperwork marked with a "sign
here" tab at the bottom of the page. One of the clauses catches her atten-
tion:
I agree that I will settle any and all previously unasserted claims,
disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to my application
or candidacy for employment, employment and/or cessation of em-
ployment with Regional Bank, exclusively by final and binding ar-
bitration before a neutral Arbitrator. By way of example only, such
claims include claims under federal, state, and local statutory or
common law, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including the
amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the law of contract, and the law of tort. 12
She re-reads the clause and vaguely wonders what Title VII is. She
asks the human resources manager, "If the company breaks the law, I
still have the right to sue, right?" The human resources manager explains
that as a condition of continued employment, she has to agree to the con-
tract, and tells her that if she does not agree to the company's terms of
employment, he has a pile of resumes stacked a foot high from which he
can choose another employee.
Like most individuals signing these types of contracts, she does not
take the contract to an attorney for scrutiny. She does not appreciate the
ultimatum approach taken by the human resources manager, but she
needs to keep her job. The human resources manager has made it clear
that she has no room to negotiate. The teller thinks to herself, "I'm sure
nothing is going to happen to me-the last year has gone so well-and
surely, if anything should happen, the clause cannot really mean what it
says." She initials next to the clause, signs the rest of the contract, hands
it back to the human resources manager, and returns to work.
Several months later she is unexpectedly terminated. Her supervisor
tells her that she has had some cash drawer irregularities and manage-
ment is just following their written policies by terminating her. The teller
knows that other employees have had cash drawer irregularities, but she
12. This example is based on one version of the arbitration clause included in the Circuit City
Stores Dispute Resolution Agreement. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
109-10 (2001).
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has observed different treatment of such episodes depending upon
whether the teller is male or female. She mentions this to the supervisor,
who tells her that his mind is made up and that she needs to clear out her
desk.
The young teller just wants her job back. She tries to talk to the
human resources manager, who says there is nothing he can do. Angry
and frustrated, she points out the disparate treatment between male and
female tellers with cash drawer irregularities. She tells the human re-
sources manager that if there is nothing he can do, perhaps she will just
have to call an attorney. He says, "Good luck. You signed an arbitration
clause. You'll never see the inside of a courtroom."
Employees in a number of industries face variations of this sce-
nario. 1 3 Specifically, employees of Credit Suisse First Boston, Anheuser-
Busch, and Halliburton were required, under such clauses, to waive their
right to sue in court for claims including wrongful firing, harassment,
and discrimination.1 4 Stockbrokers may have signed such clauses when
joining the major exchanges.1 5 Approximately 60,000 Circuit City em-
ployees agreed to such a clause upon accepting employment.' 6 Thou-
sands of employers and hundreds of thousands of employees may poten-
tially be affected by such clauses. 17
Arbitration clauses vary. They range from agreements to arbitrate
all contractual claims arising specifically out of the employment relation-
ship to agreements to arbitrate for any and all claims. These latter agree-
ments generally encompass federal law claims such as anti-
discrimination statutes. Such agreements are particularly important to
legislators, courts, employees, and arbitration advocates, because an em-
13. See, e.g., Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 105 (retail workers); EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton
& Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2003) (employees of a law firm); Penn v. Ryan's Family
Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 940, 941 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (restaurant workers); Credit Suisse First
Boston Corp. v. Pitofsky, 768 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437 (2003) (bank employees); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v.
Super. Ct., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (fitness company worker); Tjart v. Smith
Barney, Inc., 107 Wash. App. 885, 889, 28 P.3d 823, 825 (2001) (stockbrokers); Young v. Ferrell-
gas, 106 Wash. App. 524, 526, 21 P.3d 334, 335 (2001) (transportation workers).
14. Joanne Gordon, Here Come Da Judge, FORBES, Dec. 9, 2002, at 60.
15. Nonetheless, some Wall Street firms have eliminated mandatory arbitration as a condition
of employment, and the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange have removed the mandatory
arbitration requirement from their registration forms, despite the litigation against Solomon Smith
Barney and the fact that courts have held such clauses valid. Mary Stowell & Linda Friedman, Letter
to the Editor, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 19, 2002, at 15. See also Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144
F.3d 1182, 1186 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Press Release, NASD, NASD Proposes Eliminating
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims for Registered Brokers (Aug. 8,
1997)); Deborah Lohse, NASD Votes to End Arbitration Rule in Cases of Bias, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8,
1997, at B14,
16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109-
10 (No. 99-1379) (2001).
17. Id. at 10.
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ployee who has been discriminated against has certain statutory rights
and remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 However,
when an employee's claim is relegated to arbitration, a private process
that is not required to follow our statutory law to the letter, the employee
may not receive the remedies Congress intended.
Employees agree to these arbitration clauses for a variety of rea-
sons. Many do not read the clause or understand that they are potentially
waiving their right to a jury trial.' 9 Most do not accurately evaluate the
likelihood that the employment relationship could sour20 or feel they
have no other choice.21 At least in the case of pre-dispute agreements,
employees cannot obtain the information they need to appropriately ex-
amine such risks and make a truly knowledgeable decision about whether
to sign such an agreement. 22 Upon objecting to the clause, the employee
may be told that the employment offer is contingent upon agreement to
the employer's terms, without negotiation.23
The law regarding arbitration clauses has substantially shifted twice
since 1974, when the United States Supreme Court stated that Title VII
discrimination claims were not subject to this type of mandatory arbitra-
tion clause.24 The first shift came when Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991,25 which for the first time specifically mentioned alternative
dispute resolution as one of the available resolution methods for Title VII
claims.2 6 The second shift came when the Supreme Court held, in Circuit
City Stores v. Adams, that the Federal Arbitration Act's liberal policy of
enforcing arbitration agreements extends to all employees who sign
mandatory arbitration clauses, except transportation workers.27
18.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
19. See generally Katherine Eddy, To Every Remedy a Wrong: The Confounding of Civil Lib-
erties Through Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 771,
772 (2001).
20. See Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Man-
datory Arbitration, 90 CAL. LAW. REV. 1203, 1229 (2002).
21. See Beam, supra note 9, at 532.
22. See Bodie, supra note 10, at 6 (stating that "the information necessary to determine the
efficiency of pre-dispute agreements is likely to be unavailable to employees who contemplate such
agreements" and that "the cost-benefit analysis that employees can make about post-dispute agree-
ments to arbitrate is more likely to be accurate, and thus more likely to produce an efficient result,
than the analysis that employees can make about a pre-dispute agreement").
23. See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2003).
24. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1974) ("[T]he arbitrator has au-
thority to resolve only questions of contractual rights, and this authority remains regardless of
whether certain contractual rights are similar to, or duplicative of, the substantive rights guaranteed
by Title VII.").
25.42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
26. Id.
27. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
[Vol. 28:467
2005] Mandatory Arbitration of Title VII Employment Claims 809
Until recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had been the lone
voice of dissent against the enforcement of some mandatory arbitration
clauses. 28 The Ninth Circuit had consistently held that enforcement of
mandatory arbitration clauses is perfectly appropriate in contractual dis-
putes, but that Title VII cases are different.29 However, in 2002, the
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed itself and fell in line with the rest
of the circuits, holding that arbitration clauses may be enforced even in
Title VII cases.3 °
Because the previously conflicting judicial decisions caused confu-
sion as to the enforceability of arbitration clauses, some employers have
removed such clauses from their employment contracts as a precondition
to employment,3' and Democrats in Congress have proposed legislation
that would outlaw mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.3 2 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 33 ("EEOC") has even
adopted a mediation-based alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") pro-
gram to encourage parties to voluntarily mediate their discrimination is-
sues.34 Nonetheless, courts still hold mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements to be both legal and enforceable, disregarding Congress' in-
tent and failing to acknowledge that the resolution of statutory discrimi-
nation claims and arbitration are incompatible.
35
28. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998); Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999); see also, e.g., Anthony Craft v.
Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998).
29. See, e.g., Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185.
30. See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2003).
31. See Stowell & Friedman, supra note 15, at 15.
32. See infra notes 223-237 and accompanying text.
33. The EEOC is a bipartisan commission, created in 1964 to enforce the employment aspects
of civil rights legislation including Title VII. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, EEOC PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FY 2004: EEOC AT A GLANCE,
at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/par/2004/eeoc at a_glance.html (last modified Nov. 18,
2004).
Through the Commission's Office of Federal Operations, Office of Field Programs, Office of
General Counsel, and fifty-one field offices across the United States, the EEOC fulfills its purpose
by counseling individuals about their rights under the civil rights laws, adjudicates administrative
hearings on equal employment opportunity complaints, and provides education and outreach. Id.
34. The EEOC reports that the number of successful resolutions through voluntary mediation
increased from 1631 in 1998 to 7438 in 2001. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: AN OVERVIEW, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/overview.html (last modified July 25, 2001).
35. See, e.g., Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Tjart v. Smith Barney,
Inc., 107 Wash. App. 885,887, 28 P.3d 823, 829 (2001).
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A. Arbitration Is Not Merely a Change of Scenery
Arbitration, although perfectly suited to some types of disputes,3 6
has its critics. Some of the general criticisms of arbitration apply pro-
foundly to the challenges of employee plaintiffs in Title VII cases. Man-
datory arbitration clauses are common in job applications and employ-
ment contracts for low-wage jobs,3 7 where access to a judicial forum and
to federal statutory remedies are especially critical because of the em-
ployee or applicant's potential lack of bargaining power. The primary
criticisms of arbitration, when used to settle employee Title VII disputes,
focus on disadvantages related to appeals, the potential cost-prohibitive
nature of arbitration, limited discovery, and concerns about arbitrator
bias.
1. A Judicial Forum Provides for Review on the Merits
Plaintiffs forced to arbitrate Title VII claims face two primary bar-
riers to review of the arbitrator's decision. First, the grounds for review
of arbitration decisions are extremely narrow. Second, even when a
plaintiff is able to have a arbitrator's decision reviewed, review is hin-
dered because arbitrators are not generally required to provide a detailed
report of their findings to support their decisions.
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides four grounds upon
which an award may be vacated: (1) The award was obtained by corrup-
tion, fraud, or undue means; (2) the arbitrator was not impartial, or acted
corruptly; (3) the arbitrator misbehaved procedurally by refusing to hear
evidence or through other behavior that prejudiced the rights of a party;
or (4) the arbitrator exceeded his powers or executed his power "so im-
perfectly ...that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made., 38 Higher courts do not review arbitra-
36. See Sherwyn, infra note 61, at 99. Anecdotally, the author was quite satisfied with post-
dispute, binding arbitration as a method to settle her claims stemming from a motor vehicle accident.
Arbitration may be an ideal forum for resolution of disputes in situations where the parties are in
roughly equal positions in terms of power, for example, between the merchants contemplated by the
drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act. See infra Part III.A. One commentator has gone so far as to
suggest the implementation of a separate Federal Arbitration Act that would specifically address the
concerns introduced when the parties do not have roughly equal bargaining power. See Sarah Ru-
dolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
759, 780 (2001).
37. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae of Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et. al.
at 3, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-1823) (employee was a grill
operator who earned $5.50/hour); Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 940, 941
(N.D. Ind. 2000) (chain-restaurant waiter); Sheller by Sheller v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957
F. Supp. 150, 152 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (teenage cashiers).
38.9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).
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tion judgments on the merits. 39 Arbitrators' judgments comport more
with the contractual expectations of the parties and potentially less with
the law because courts will not vacate an arbitration decision on the basis
of the arbitrator's misunderstanding of the law.4 °
While focusing on the parties' contractual expectations makes sense
in conflicts related to wages, promotion schedules, and benefits that arise
directly from the employment contract, this focus does not make sense
once discrimination occurs. Litigants assert discrimination claims under
statutory law, not under a breach of contract theory; for this reason, the
parties should have the option of ensuring that their dispute is heard in a
forum that requires compliance with the law and where both parties have
the opportunity to pursue an appeal on the merits. When litigants take a
Title VII case to court, judges apply long-standing precedent to reach a
result that effectuates the policies of the Civil Rights Act.4' An arbitrator,
however, is generally not bound to apply such law,42 and the arbitration
plaintiff cannot appeal when the arbitrator fails to properly apply the law.
Although it is often asserted that arbitration merely changes the fo-
rum,43 when the arbitrator misunderstands or misapplies the law, the im-
plications for the parties can be much more than just a change of scenery.
Although judges may also misinterpret or misapply the law, appellate
courts are available to remedy the trial courts' errors.
Gaining an appeal is even more challenging for plaintiffs because
arbitrators are generally not required to provide written explanations for
39. Storer Broad. Co. v. Am. Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 600 F.2d 45, 47 (6th Cir.
1979).
40. See Coast Trading Co. v. Pac. Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1982); see also
Marion Mfg. Co. v. Long, 588 F.2d 538, 540 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[E]ven if the result reached by an
arbitration panel were not 'equitable' it must be upheld by courts unless clearly erroneous. 9 U.S.C.
§§ 10, 11. The federal courts do not sit to review arbitrator's award de novo or to instruct an arbitra-
tor in computation of damages."). But see Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 368 F.3d 1109, 1112
(9th Cir. 2004). The court found that a substantial federal question was presented and that federal
courts have jurisdiction to entertain a petition where an employee plaintiff claimed that the arbitrator
manifestly disregarded federal case law in reaching the arbitration award. Id. Ultimately, however,
the court upheld the arbitration award, reasoning that the arbitrator did not ignore federal case law
and thus did not act in manifest disregard of federal law. Id.
41. See, e.g., Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065-70 (9th Cir. 2003) (analyzing
an employment discrimination claim under thirty years of Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit prece-
dent, from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) to Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
539 U.S. 90 (2003)).
42. See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Mar. I, 2004), available at http://www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=21958 (identifying the obligations to preserve the integrity and fairness of the arbitral
process, disclose interests or relationships, and make decisions in a just, independent, and deliberate
manner, but including no mention of any requirement to apply relevant law to the determination of
the case).
43. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
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their decisions, unless a rule or agreement by the parties specifies that the
arbitrator will issue complete findings of fact and law.44 Even if the con-
tract calls for application of a specific set of arbitration rules, the arbitra-
tor may not be required to enter full findings of fact and law. Less strin-
gent rules may permit the arbitrator simply to enter "written reasons for
the award. 4 5
If employees were actually able to negotiate the terms of their arbi-
tration clauses, they could condition acceptance of the clause on a re-
quirement that the arbitrator issue complete, written findings of fact and
conclusions of law to preserve the proceedings for appeal. However,
most employees do not have the bargaining power or the foresight to ne-
gotiate the terms of these contracts, so they must be accepted as drafted.
2. Arbitration Can Be Cost Prohibitive
The cost of arbitration can be very high.46 Costs may be so high that
employees drop their complaints because they cannot afford to pursue
them.
Although courts have held agreements unconscionable that require
employees to pay potentially exorbitant arbitration costs, 48 plaintiffs still
face challenges to establishing a cost-prohibitive defense sufficient to
satisfy a court.4 9 Even courts that are willing to accept a cost-prohibitive
defense perform their analysis on a case-by-case basis, which may bene-
fit low-income employees, but may not assist higher or middle income
employees.5 °
44. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 245 n.4 (1962) ("Arbitrators generally
have no obligation to give their reasons for an award."); see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
Am., 350 U.S. 198, 204 n.4 (1956) ("[A]rbitrators need not disclose facts or reasons behind award.")
(quoting Shirley Silk Co. v. Am. Silk Mills, Inc., 13 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (1939)); Campbell v. Cantor
Fitzgerald & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 341, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
45. Rule 34(c), National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.aspid=22075#n34 (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
46. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 45-46, Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d
1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-15687) (acknowledging that record established that securities arbitra-
tors charged fees starting at $1000 per half day, which totaled $82,000 in a complex case); Camp-
bell, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 343 (arbitrators ruled against employee without written explanation and as-
sessed $45,000 in hearing fees).
47. PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION MORE EXPENSIVE THAN COURT - SO COSTLY THAT MANY
VICTIMS OF CONSUMER FRAUD, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION GIVE UP, http://www.citizen.org/
pressroom/release.cfm?ID= 1098 (May 1, 2002).
48. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2003).
49. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) ("The 'risk' that [a
plaintiff] will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an
arbitration agreement.").
50. See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669 (holding that employee salary is relevant to determining
whether a cost-splitting rule would deter a substantial percentage of similarly situated potential liti-
gants from bringing their claims).
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The cost of arbitrating an employment dispute can easily exceed the
cost of a lawsuit.5' A plaintiff forced to arbitrate a $60,000 employment
discrimination claim will incur costs ranging from three to nearly fifty
times the cost of litigating in a judicial forum. 52 These costs are poten-
tially so high because the arbitration provider is often agreed upon in the
terms of the contract 3 and there is no price competition among arbitra-
tors.54 A more sinister, perhaps accurate, charge is that companies use
mandatory arbitration clauses to prevent employees from asserting their
legal rights. As such, employers have no incentive to arrange low-cost
arbitration because a high-cost arbitrator may deter employees from fil-
ing claims.55
In addition, arbitration providers charge extra fees that claimants
would not be charged if they were litigating their claims in court. For
example, arbitration participants must pay $75 for the National Arbitra-
tion Forum (NAF) to issue a subpoena, but courts issue them for free.56
Moreover, while courts do not charge for discovery requests and con-
tinuances, in arbitration, participants must pay the NAF $150 for a dis-
covery request and $100 for a continuance. 57 Additionally, the parties do
not actually pay the judge's salary in the course of in-court litigation, but
an American Arbitration Association arbitrator charges a rate consistent
58with the arbitrator's stated rate of compensation. Nonrefundable filing
fees may cost arbitration participants up to $125. 59 In order to postpone a
hearing, the postponing party must pay $150.60 Over the course of an
extended arbitration, these additional fees can amount to one very expen-
sive "alternative forum."
Advocates of arbitration praise the efficiency and cost-effectiveness
of the process. 61 However, prior to a Public Citizen study, no research
had been undertaken and no studies had been completed to substantiate
51. Id.
52. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, COST OF ARBITRATION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://www.citizen
.org/congress/civjus/arbitration/articles.cfm?ID=7546 (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
53. See, e.g., Morrison, 317 F.3d at 654.
54. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 52.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Rule 40, National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22075 (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See e.g., David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Dis-
putes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 99 (1999) (arguing that arbitration is "faster and less expensive than
litigation in court").
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those claims. 62 Until research demonstrates that the benefits of manda-
tory arbitration apply equally to employees and employers, the cost-
63efficiency of arbitration should be considered a suspect justification.
3. Limited Discovery in Arbitration Hurts Plaintiffs
Although employers celebrate the limited discovery requirements
of arbitration, limited discovery hurts plaintiffs64 and presents a particu-
larly difficult challenge to discrimination victims. 65 For example, in the
case of a female employee who is denied a promotion, the employer may
justify the denial on the basis that the employee's qualifications were
unsatisfactory, despite the fact that the employee received satisfactory
performance reviews and had comparable qualifications to a man pro-
moted to the position. If this employee is lucky, she has copies of her
performance reviews as evidence that the reason provided by her em-
ployer for the denial was pretextual. In arbitration, those documents may
be all the evidence she has to prove her discrimination case.
If she were able to sue in court, discovery would allow her access to
documents in her personnel file, information about the person promoted,
and depositions from other employees and managers who may have evi-
dence of the employer's bias. All this evidence would help support her
case of discrimination and none of it is likely to be available to her in the
arbitration proceedings.
4. Multiple Plaintiffs Means Repeat Business and
Possible Bias Among Arbitrators
Arbitration does not resolve claims for multiple plaintiffs once and
for all the way that class action lawsuits are designed to do. Employers,
if Circuit City is any example, are likely dealing with multiple suits
brought because of the same arbitration clause, especially when there is
62. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 52.
63. Perhaps unexpectedly, problems are also present for employers, although employers benefit
disproportionately. With the promise of substantial savings on litigation costs, more efficient resolu-
tion of disputes and the limited scope of discovery, fewer embarrassing trials and runaway jury
awards, and no class actions, employers expected mandatory arbitration to be a panacea for the reso-
lution of claims. See, e.g., Robert Leventhal & Howard Cohen, Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses-Powerful When Used Correctly, at http://foley.com/publications/pubdetail.aspx
?pubid= 1724 (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). In reality, mandatory arbitration has its critics among those
employers and industries that have used it in the past, as evidenced by the NASD dropping the arbi-
tration clause from its applications. See sources cited supra note 15.
64. See generally David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbi-
tration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law
Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 26 (2003).
65. Id. (recognizing that limited discovery may impede counsel's efforts to prove pretext or to
find the proverbial "smoking gun" in discrimination and harassment cases).
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merit to the plaintiffs' claims. 66 That means that the employer do repeat
business with the same arbitration provider, which, studies show, results
in smaller awards against employers.67 In addition, plaintiffs with the
same arbitration clause and similar claims may receive widely diverse
remedies because different arbitrators may not apply the law uniformly
and are not bound by judicial precedent or the decisions of other arbitra-
tors.68
5. Public Policy Demands That Discrimination Claims
Be Heard in Public
In addition to the benefits to individual employees, public policy
does not support forcing individual employees to arbitrate their discrimi-
nation claims. Rather, the public interest is served when violations of
anti-discrimination laws are resolved through the judicial system, in pub-
lic, and under the scrutiny of the industry, other plaintiffs, and the pub-
lic. 69 Open, public litigation provides precedent for the resolution of fu-
ture cases and helps ensure that similar cases are treated similarly under
consistent law and are not the result of ad hoc decision making somehow
rooted in the contractual expectations of the parties.
Finally, a public verdict, accessible in a public record that is subject
to scrutiny by the community at large and the media, provides an educa-
tional opportunity for other employers. Judicial decisions help employ-
ment attorneys and their clients draft workplace policies and procedures,
both to help prevent discrimination in the workplace and to protect em-
ployers from liability.
6. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Community Knows Best
Even segments of the ADR community have acknowledged that
mandatory arbitration does not benefit the ADR industry 70 or employ-
66. See cases cited infra note 148.
67. Armendariz v. Found. Heath Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000).
68. See Monica J. Washington, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes:
Judicial Review Without Judicial Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844, 850 (1999).
69. See, e.g., Young v. Ferrellgas, 106 Wash. App. 524, 527, 21 P.3d 334, 335 (2001); infra
notes 245-251 and accompanying text (recognizing that when a claim is brought to vindicate the
public interest and the employee's interest, and there is a conflict between the public policy favoring
arbitration and that underlying a statutory tort, the conflict is resolved in favor of the tort action).
Had the employees of Johnson Controls, Inc., been bound to arbitrate discrimination claims with
their employer, the United States Supreme Court may never have ruled that employers cannot bar all
fertile women from workplaces where they might be exposed to toxic substances and that the work-
place must be made safe for all workers. See, e.g., Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187,
211 (1991).
70. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National Academy of Arbitrators ("NAA") in Support of
the Respondent at 4, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379).
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ees.71 In May 1997, the National Academy of Arbitrators ("NAA") re-
sponded to concerns that enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses
would be detrimental to the arbitration process.72 The NAA adopted a
policy statement opposing mandatory employment arbitration as a condi-
tion of employment when employees are required to waive their statutory
rights or their direct access to a judicial or administrative forum.73
Although judicial resolution remains the best method to address the
fairness concerns in employment disputes, even voluntary, post-dispute
arbitration provides a better solution than mandatory arbitration.74 De-
spite the inherent concerns about the arbitration process, 75 an employee
should have the opportunity to opt-in to voluntary arbitration, especially
upon the advice of an attorney. In the words of Patricia Ireland, President
of the National Organization for Women, "If proponents of arbitration
are correct in their belief that it is faster, cheaper, and better than the ju-
dicial system, then surely employees and their attorneys will opt for arbi-
tration in a voluntary system. ' 76
Commentators repeatedly raise the preceding arguments to refute
the notion that arbitration is merely a change of scenery from the tradi-
tional judicial forum for the resolution of statutory claims. Although
courts refuse to acknowledge that subjecting employee claims to arbitra-
tion is overly harsh and burdensome to the employee, continued criticism
by scholars, civil rights activists, employees, and some judges has lead to
efforts at legislative reform and the application of state law defenses such
as procedural unconscionability.
At this point, the reader is familiar with the problems faced by em-
ployees forced to arbitrate their employment-related claims. The follow-
71. Some say that any ADR method other than arbitration is a better solution. See generally
Richard R. Ross, The Pros and Cons of Mandatory Company Employment Programs, 20
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LIT1G. 183, 201 (2002) (discussing the proposition that "arbitration is
the most controversial part of any employment ADR program ... without this step, there is almost
no controversy or opposition to the use of employment ADR").
72. BriefofAmicus Curiae NAA, supra note 70, at 3.
73. Id.
74. The best solution for all parties involved is a situation where employees are able to know-
ingly and voluntarily enter into a process where decades of carefully crafted civil rights statutes and
case law are applied to the facts of a given case, in a public forum and with the opportunity for judi-
cial review. If courts continue to enforce arbitration agreements in the employment context, then it is
up to the ADR industry to work to make changes to ensure fairness for plaintiffs. Written opinions,
subject to judicial review, should be issued for any cases involving a statutory claim. This would
help ensure that judicial precedent is applied and that the remedies comport with those provided by
statutory law.
75. See supra notes 37-69 and accompanying text.
76. See Patricia Ireland, Testimony of the National Organization for Women Before a Commit-
tee of the National Association of Securities Dealers (June 1997), available at http://www.now.org/
issues/wfw/nasd-testimony.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
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ing section explores both the statutory foundations for the current con-
flict-the Federal Arbitration Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1991-and the development of the current federal approach permitting
such agreements to be enforced against employees.
III. FEDERAL LAW BOTH ENCOURAGES ARBITRATION AND
DISCOURAGES DISCRIMINATION
A. The Federal Arbitration Act: Establishing a Federal
Policy in Favor ofArbitration
Congress enacted the FAA77 in 1925 to overcome a history of judi-
cial reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements. 78 Trade associations
and lawmakers believed that arbitration was a good solution for resolving
contractual disputes between merchants. 79 The FAA established a federal
policy in favor of arbitration 80 and created federal common law, which
preempts any state law disfavoring arbitration.81 Section 2 of the FAA
states the following:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agree-
ment in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy aris-
ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Congress intended this section to make arbitration agreements en-
forceable to the same extent as other contracts, but not more so. 83 Section
2 does not apply unless the arbitration clause is determined to be part of
the formed contract. 84
Even at the time of the proposal of the FAA, members of industry
expressed concern over its potential impact on employees. Because of
77. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
78. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
79. Id. at 279.
80. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
81. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1,24-25 (1983).
82. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
83. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
84. Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (1979).
85. Andrew Furuseth, President of the International Seaman's Union of America, said in oppo-
sition to the Act as originally proposed: "Will such contracts be signed? Esau agreed [to give up his
first birthright] because he was hungry .... With the growing hunger in modem society, there will
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these concerns,86 Congress added an additional clause to § 1 of the FAA
exempting "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 87
Courts have interpreted § 2 broadly to encompass all contracts, including
employment contracts not specifically made exempt by § 1.88
Litigation related to the FAA was rare until the 1950s, and even
then the United States Supreme Court decided only a handful of cases.89
When anti-discrimination legislation came out of the civil rights move-
ment in the 1960s, judicial decisions suggested both that employment
contracts were exempt from the FAA, and that discrimination claims oc-
cupied an area of the law especially entitled to judicial resolution.90
B. Title VII." Federal Statutory Remedies Enacted to
Discourage Discrimination
During the civil rights movement of the 1960s, Congress imple-
mented several federal statutes to eliminate discrimination in the work-
place, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 91 the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967,92 the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 93
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 94 These statutes provide remedies to
employees who have been discriminated against in the workplace.95
In particular, Title VII provides that when an employer has inten-
tionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the court may en-
be but few that will be able to resist." EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742,
754 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (quoting Proceedings of the 26th Annual Convention
of the International Seaman's Union ofAmerica, 203-04 (1923)).
86. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Employment Lawyers Association in Support of Respon-
dent Saint Clair Adams at 5, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379).
87. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
88. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113-14.
89. Three, to be exact: Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450-51
(1957) (holding that the Taft-Hartley Act subsection gives federal district courts authorization to
provide specific performance for promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining
agreements); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (finding that state law dictates
enforceability of contract provision for arbitration in a breach of employment contract case based on
diversity jurisdiction); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (ruling that pre-dispute "waiv-
ers" of judicial forum in favor of arbitration of future controversies is invalidated by the Securities
Act), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
90. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.9 (1967)
(noting that categories of contracts otherwise within the Arbitration Act are expressly excluded from
the reach of the Act when one of the parties characteristically has little bargaining power); Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-60 (1974).
91.42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
93. § 201.
94. § 791.
95. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
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join the employer from continuing the practice, and may also grant addi-
tional relief such as reinstatement or hiring of employees (with or with-
out back pay) or other equitable relief.96
Title VII specifically prohibits retaliation against employees for ac-
tivity protected under federal anti-discrimination law. 9 7 To establish a
claim of retaliation, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the employee en-
gaged in protected activity under the federal anti-discrimination laws; (2)
the employee suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) there
was a causal link between the employee's activity and the employment
decision. 98 An employer violates the federal statutory prohibitions
against retaliation if the adverse action (1) occurs because of the em-
ployee's opposition to unlawful employment practices or (2) is in retalia-
tion to the employee's "participation in the machinery set up" by the
statute to enforce its provisions.99
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the "anti-
retaliation provisions" in Title VII and other fair employment statutes are
intended to "[m]aintain unfettered access to statutory remedial mecha-
nisms."' 10 0 Congress has provided the right to bring "a civil action against
any respondent" as one tool to protect employees' statutory rights when
subjected to unlawful employment practices.'01
Plaintiff-employees subject to arbitration clauses have made claims
under Title VII for discrimination and more creative claims for retalia-
tory discharge.10 2 For example, in EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps,'0 3 the plaintiff alleged that his refusal to sign a mandatory arbi-
tration clause as a condition to employment was protected activity under
Title VII, and that his subsequent discharge was therefore a retaliatory
discharge under the statute.10 4
The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether Congress in-
tended such a "civil action" under Title VII to include arbitration in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,1°5 which generated thirty years of
disagreement and confusion about the arbitrability of Title VII claims
and the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements under the
FAA in employment contracts. In Gardner-Denver, the Court held that
96. Id.
97. § 2000e-3(a).
98. Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass'n, 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994).
99. Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978).
100. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
101.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), (3) (2000).
102. See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 1004-05 (9th Cir.
2002).
103. Id.
104. Id. See also discussion infra notes 169-200 and accompanying text.
105. 415 U.S. 36(1974).
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an arbitration decision under a collective bargaining agreement did not
preclude litigation of the same dispute as a Title VII claim. 10 6
Until 1991, courts widely interpreted Gardner-Denver "as prohibit-
ing any form of mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims."'' 0 7 Despite the
increasing popularity of arbitration in the 1980s, circuit courts consis-
tently refused to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses in the employ-
ment discrimination context pursuant to their interpretations of Gardner-
Denver. 10
8
IV. THE SUPREME COURT CHANGES THE COURSE
During the 1990s, the United States Supreme Court decided two
cases that further defined federal law with respect to mandatory arbitra-
tion.1°9 In both cases, the Supreme Court disregarded Congress' ex-
pressed intent in order to further the federal policy favoring arbitration.
Although the Supreme Court previously indicated that employment
contracts were exempt from the FAA and that statutory discrimination
claims were entitled to judicial resolution," 0 in a stunning change of
course, the Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. decision opened the
door to increased application of arbitration clauses in employment con-
tracts. Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which preserves employee rights to a judicial forum for the resolution of
discrimination claims. Despite the abundant legislative history of the
FAA indicating Congress' intent, the Supreme Court effectively sounded
the death knell for employees' rights to judicial resolution of statutory
claims with the Circuit City line of cases.
The Ninth Circuit remained the lone holdout throughout this proc-
ess, until ultimately agreeing with the Supreme Court that what the Civil
Rights Act says (or does not say) is more important than the intent with
which it was drafted. The Supreme Court and the circuit courts now all
agree that employers may force their employees to choose between their
jobs and their right to bring future Title VII claims in court.
106. Id. at 53-54.
107. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir. 1994).
108. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (collecting cases); see,
e.g., Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 105-08 (5th Cir. 1990); Utley v. Goldman
Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 185-87 (lst Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858
F.2d 1304, 1305-07 (8th Cir. 1988); Rosenfeld v. Dept. of Army, 769 F.2d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 1985);
EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1983) (Fletcher, J., concurring).
109. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (dis-
cussed infra notes 146-168 and accompanying text).
110. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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The sections that follow explain this dubious evolution of the
courts' approaches to the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses
in the employment context.
A. The Supreme Court Disregards Congressional Intent, Take One:
Gilmer v. Interstate
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.,"' leading to a decade of dispute over the arbitrability of Ti-
tle VII claims in the employment context. In its two-part holding, the
Court first clarified that Gardner-Denver was a narrow holding: Under a
collective bargaining agreement, an employee's contractual rights are
distinct from an employee's statutory Title VII rights." 2 This holding
provided the opportunity for future courts to hold that an individual em-
ployee could bargain away Title VII rights by signing a mandatory arbi-
tration clause as part of an individual employment contract.
Second, the Court held that statutory claims may be subject to a
mandatory arbitration clause in an employment contract "unless Con-
gress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue."' 1 3 The Court relied on its ear-
lier holding in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 1 4 for
this proposition--despite the vast differences in the stakes of consumers
at issue in Mitsubishi Motors and those of employees at issue in Gilmer.
Finally, the Gilmer majority found the contract at issue to be a se-
curities registration application rather than an employment contract,' 15
and therefore passed on determining whether § 1 of the FAA excludes all
employment contracts. The Court, however, was not unanimous on this
point. Two dissenting justices addressed the question of whether or not
employment contracts were covered by the FAA.' 1 6 Justice Stevens and
Justice Marshall believed that arbitration clauses in employment agree-
ments were specifically exempt from coverage of the FAA under the ex-
ception in § 1.117 Justice Stevens' dissent criticized the majority for con-
111. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25-26.
112. Id. at 33-34.
113. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
114. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628. Notably, Mitsubishi did not involve an em-
ployment contract or a contract between merchants as envisioned by Congress and industry at the
time of passage of the FAA. Rather, Mitsubishi involved a consumer who had signed a contract of
adhesion in the course of purchasing a car. And, even then, Justices Stevens and Brennan dissented,
in part on the basis that neither the text nor the legislative history of the FAA suggested that Con-
gress intended to authorize the arbitration of statutory claims. Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
116. See id., 500 U.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
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struing the scope of the exception so narrowly."18 He maintained that al-
though the FAA was primarily concerned with the "perceived need by
the business community to overturn the common-law rule that denied
specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate in contracts between
business entities," the legislative history demonstrated that Congress in-
tended for employer/employee contracts to be excluded." 19
Congress agreed with Justice Stevens and worked to remedy this
misunderstanding through the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
B. Congress Responds: The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Section 118
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA") was written prior to, and
signed into law following, the Court's decision in Gilmer. The CRA
amended several of the statutes enforced by the EEOC. Under the CRA,
employees who suffer intentional discrimination are afforded the reme-
dies of jury trials, compensatory damages, and punitive damages in Title
VII lawsuits. 20 In addition, Congress added § 118 to the notes of the
CRA, which provides the following:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement nego-
tiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials,
and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the
Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title. 121
The CRA was primarily designed to "overrule" hostile Supreme
Court decisions in order to make discrimination claims easier to assert
and prove in federal courts. 122
Congress intended to increase the possible remedies to civil rights
plaintiffs by making ADR methods explicitly available under the law,' 23
but the question remained: Did Congress intend to encourage voluntary,
post-dispute adoption of ADR mechanisms, or did it intend to endorse
mandatory arbitration agreements? Senator Dole stated that Congress
intended to encourage arbitration only "where the parties knowingly and
voluntarily elect to use these methods."'' 24
118. Id. at 39.
119. Id.
120. See Jeffrey Scot Fowler, Punitive Damages in Actions for Violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 150 A.L.R. Fed. 601 ("In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ... Con-
gress created a provision allowing compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII claims.").
121. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
122. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998).
123. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994).
124. Id. at 1305 (quoting 137 CONG. REC. S15472, S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement
of Sen. Dole)).
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The House Judiciary Committee approved the bill. 25 The Commit-
tee's explanation of § 118 paralleled the Conference Report's account of
the same section in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which President George
H.W. Bush vetoed for other reasons. 126 That report explained that "any
agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration ... in an employment
contract does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under
the enforcement provisions of Title VII.'5127
In fact, Congress specifically rejected a proposal that would have
permitted the enforcement of "compulsory" arbitration agreements:
H.R. I includes a provision encouraging the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution to supplement, rather than supplant, the
rights and remedies provided by Title VII. The Republican substi-
tute, however, encourages the use of such mechanisms "in place of
judicial resolution." Thus, under the latter proposal employers could
refuse to hire workers unless they signed a binding statement waiv-
ing all rights to file Title VII complaints. Such a rule would fly in
the face of Supreme Court decisions holding that workers have the
right to go to court, rather than being forced into compulsory arbi-
tration, to resolve important statutory and constitutional rights[.] 128
During floor debates, members of Congress repeatedly echoed
Senator Dole's "knowing and voluntary" requirement, bolstering the
Committee's position on § 118.129 During the debate just prior to the
CRA's passage, Representative Edwards, Chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor,. explained that the provision was "in-
tended to be consistent with ... Gardner-Denver,"'130 by stating the fol-
lowing:
This section contemplates the use of voluntary arbitration to resolve
specific disputes after they have arisen, not coercive attempts to
force employees in advance to forego statutory rights. No approval
whatsoever is intended of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Gilmer... or any application or extension of it to Title VII. 131
Lastly, even dissenting views on the bill support the theory that
Congress intended only to encourage voluntary, post-dispute arbitration
125. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 549.
126. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1196.
127. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-755, at 26 (1990).
128. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 104 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 642.
129. 137 CONG. REC. S15478; see also 137 CONG. REC. H9548 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Hyde).
130. Appellant's Opening Brief at 34-36, Duffield, 144 F.3d 1182 (No. 97-15687) (citing 137
CONG. REC. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards)).
131. 137 CONG. REC. H9530 (statement of Rep. Edwards).
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of disagreements. 132 The Committee minority report complained that be-
cause § 118 encouraged only voluntary agreements, it was "nothing more
than an empty promise" to those who wished to encourage arbitration of
more Title VII claims. 133
Despite this available legislative history, with only a few excep-
tions, courts have imputed a meaning to the language of the FAA, Title
VII, and the CRA of 1991 that Congress did not intend. Several federal
courts have held that § 118 makes mandatory arbitration agreements in
employment contracts enforceable.134 However, the Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed, consistently holding such contracts to be illegal.
C. The Ninth Circuit Holds Its Ground. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens
Despite the Supreme Court's apparent change of heart between its
Gardner-Denver and Gilmer decisions on the issue of mandatory arbitra-
tion of statutory claims, Gardner-Denver and the CRA laid the founda-
tion for the Ninth Circuit's controversial and much maligned decision135
in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co. 136
In Duffield, the Ninth Circuit held that employers may not require,
as a condition of employment, that employees waive their right to bring
Title VII and other statutory claims in court by agreeing to a mandatory
arbitration clause. 137 The court distinguished systems under which em-
ployees choose, post-dispute, to submit claims to arbitration, and focused
its analysis on situations related to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
132. Appellant's Opening Brief at 34-36, Duffield, 144 F.3d 1182 (No. 97-15687).
133. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 78 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 616.
134. See, e.g., Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Markets, 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding
that § 118 reflected a clear intent to encourage arbitration of Title VII claims, and that parties'
agreement to arbitrate was enforceable); Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1279,
1282 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (finding, "in light of" § 118, no reason to preclude enforcement of the arbitra-
tion agreement); Shaw v. DLJ Pershing, 78 F. Supp. 2d 781, 782 (N.D. I11. 1999) (holding manda-
tory arbitration provision valid and enforceable because of the "clear Congressional intent" evi-
denced by § 118 to encourage arbitration of Title VII claims).
135. See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir, 2003)
(overruling Duffield because it was "wrongly decided"); Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d
1307, 1315 (11 th Cir. 2002) (stating that, after pointing out that Duffield had been considered and
rejected by other courts, it "see[s] no reason to depart from our own precedent, the mandate of the
Supreme Court, and the holdings of almost every other circuit to find that compulsory arbitration
agreements constitute an unlawful employment practice"); Koveleskie, 167 F.3d at 365 ("respect-
fully disagree[ing] with the Ninth Circuit on [the issue of compulsory arbitration of Title VII
claims], and instead concur[ring] with the majority of circuits that have held that Congress did not
intend Title VII to preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements."). See also Keith A.
Becker & Dianne R. LaRocca, Divided Court Crosses Wires over Circuit City Decision: Holding
Casts Doubt on Ninth Circuit's Duffield Decision, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 403, 410-11 (2002)
(recognizing the controversy and ambiguity surrounding the Duffield decision).
136. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
137. Id. at 1185.
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clauses.138 After a thorough analysis of the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,139 the court concluded that Congress intended to
enlarge the range of substantive rights available to plaintiffs, not con-
strict them. 4
0
Although the settled Ninth Circuit law was that the FAA did not
apply to employment contracts, and that mandatory arbitration of statu-
tory claims was not permitted under the CRA, the other circuit courts
disagreed.' 41 By 2002, eleven circuits and one state supreme court had
either determined or reaffirmed that this exclusion covered only contracts
of individuals employed in the interstate or international transportation of
goods and people, applying the narrowest possible interpretation of the
commerce clause. 14
2
On the other hand, many states agreed with the Ninth Circuit. Sev-
eral states enacted legislation to help protect employees from these types
of contracts. 143 Five states allowed the enforcement of voluntary post-
dispute arbitration agreements, but precluded the enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes. 144 Some state courts took matters into
138. Id. at 1187.
139. See supra notes 120-132 and accompanying text.
140. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190-91.
141. See supra note 108.
142. Brief of Amicus Curiae Employers Group in Support of Petitioner at 3, Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379) (citing Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258,
264 n.5 (1st Cir. 1998)); McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1998); Paladino
v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060-61 (11 th Cir. 1998) (Op. of Cox, J. and Tjoflat,
J.); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Realty Advisory Bd. on Labor Relations, 107 F.3d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1997);
Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 1997); O'Neil v. Hilton Head
Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835-36
(8th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK
Commun., Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); Brown v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 921 P.2d 146,
156 n.13 (Haw. 1996); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1995);
Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50, 53 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995)).
143. Brief of the States of California, Arizona, Arkansas et al. in Support of Respondent at 15,
Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105 (No. 99-1379) (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-1517 (2000), which exempts
"arbitration agreements between employers and employees or their respective representatives" from
the State's arbitration act); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (Banks-Baldwin 1998) (same); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:4216 (West 2000) (excluding "contracts of employment of labor"); OKLA. STAT. tit.
15, § 818 (1999) (excluding "employer and employee relations"); WIS. STATS. § 788.01 (1999)
(excluding "contracts between employers and employees and between employers and associations of
employees").
144. Brief of the States of California et al. at 15-18 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201
(Michie 1999) (exempting arbitration agreements in "employer-employee disputes .. . thereafter
arising between the parties" from the State's arbitration act)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1999)
(exempting "contracts between an employer and employees, or their respective representatives ... to
submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising"); ALA. CODE § 8-1-41 (2000) (providing
that an arbitration agreement cannot be specifically enforced); Ex parte Clements, 587 So. 2d 317,
319 (Ala. 1991) ("[U]nless the FAA is applicable, pre-dispute arbitration agreements are void in
Alabama as against public policy."); State v. Nebraska Ass'n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d 577,
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their own hands, holding that contracts to arbitrate employment discrimi-
nation claims violated the states' public policies and were unenforce-
able. 45 The discord made it clear that the United States Supreme Court
had not decided its last case on the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments.
D. The Supreme Court Disregards Congressional Intent, Take Two.
Circuit City Stores v. Adams
Continuing its reign as the hotbed of activity with respect to manda-
tory arbitration agreements, the Ninth Circuit took the spotlight again
when the United States Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in Cir-
cuit City Stores v. Adams by reversing a Ninth Circuit decision 46 that
had earlier reversed a district court's order compelling arbitration. 147
In October 1995, Saint Clair Adams applied for employment with
Circuit City Stores. As part of the employment application, Adams
agreed to settle "claims, disputes or controversies ... exclusively by final
and binding arbitration." The much-litigated provision148 went on to state
that "[b]y way of example only, such claims include claims under fed-
eral, state, and local statutory or common law" including, by name, the
ADEA, "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including
the amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991," the ADA, and contract
and tort law. 149
Two years later, Adams sued Circuit City in state court, asserting
claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act' 50 and other
tort claims under California law.' 5 ' Circuit City moved to compel arbitra-
580 (1991) (holding the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act violates the Nebraska Constitution to the
extent it requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes)).
145. Brief of the States of California et al. at 17.
146. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).
147. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. 98-365, 1998 WL 1797183, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May
4, 1998).
148. See, e.g., Al-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254, 1256 (9th Cir. 2005); Ingle
v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004);
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160
(2004); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
1112 (2002) (all holding that the contract was unconscionable and unenforceable); see also, e.g.,
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 654 (6th Cir. 2003), Johnson v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373, 374 (4th Cir. 1998), after remand, 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 530 U.S. 1276 (2000); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 818 (S.D.
Ohio 1999); Sportelli v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 97-5850, 1998 WL 54335, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
13, 1998).
149. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 110 (2001).
150. Id. (referencing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997)).
151. Id.
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tion and the district court granted the motion.152 Adams appealed to the
Ninth Circuit,1 53 where the court held that the FAA did not apply because
the arbitration agreement was part of an employment contract, and re-
manded to the district court.1
54
Circuit City appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 5 5 The five-member majority held that the Ninth
Circuit erred by excluding all employment contracts from the FAA be-
cause the "engaged in commerce" exclusion in § I of the FAA should be
narrowly construed. 5 6 Under this view, only contracts of employment of
transportation workers were exempted.157 The majority based part of its
reasoning on the interpretive maxim of ejusdem generic-when a general
term follows specific terms, the general term covers only examples of the
same sort as the preceding specifics. 58 Under this reading, the § I exclu-
sion applies to "seamen" and "railroad employees," and the residual
clause, "any other class of workers engaged in .. .commerce" means
only those individuals whose work is similar to that of seamen and rail-
road employees. 159
Four members of the Supreme Court dissented in two separate
opinions. Justice Stevens' dissent was joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer and, in part, by Justice Souter. 60 Justice Stevens' dissent looked
largely to the inclusive section of the FAA, § 2, which states that written
agreements to arbitrate are enforceable "in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce."' 6 ' Analyzing the
FAA's legislative history, Justice Stevens concluded that Congress had
not intended that the FAA apply to labor disputes at all 162 but instead had
added the § 1 exemption specifically in response to concerns that the
FAA might be used to enforce arbitration clauses in employment con-
tracts and collective-bargaining agreements. 163
Justice Souter's dissent, which also focused on the § I exemption,
was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.' 64 Justice Souter
152. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. 98-365, 1998 WL 1797183, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May
4, 1998).
153. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).
154. Id. at 1071.
155. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 105 (2001).
156. Id. at 119.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 114-15.
159. Id. at 114.
160. Id. at 124 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
161. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)).
162. Id. at 127.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 133.
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argued that the exemption for employment contracts had kept "pace with
the expanded understanding of the commerce power generally, ' 165 and
concluded that the majority's reading of § I was impermissibly nar-
row. 16 6 He also took issue with the majority's application of ejusdem
generis and argued that because the interpretation could be overruled by
contrary legislative history, the application of ejusdem generis was inap-
propriate in this case.1 6 7
Despite these strong dissents, Circuit City became known as the
case that made mandatory arbitration agreements enforceable in em-
ployment contracts for all employees except transportation workers. 68
While the Circuit City case wound its way through the federal courts,
another important California case was working its way through the Cali-
fornia and Ninth Circuit courts.
E. The Ninth Circuit Falls in Line: EEOC v. Luce Forward
In EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps169 the question
again came to the Ninth Circuit: Can employers require employees, as a
condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate Title VII claims that arise
in the course of their employment?
In September 1997, Donald Scott Lagatree was offered a position
as a legal secretary at Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP ("Luce
Forward"), a California law firm.170 When Lagatree reported to work, he
received a "Letter of Employment," which confirmed the offer and de-
tailed the terms of his employment.1 7 The offer letter included an arbi-
tration provision, which stated that "claims arising from or related to" his
employment must be settled using binding arbitration.172 Lagatree re-
fused to sign the agreement because he believed that it was unfair. 173 La-
gatree testified that he did not want to give up his right to "a jury trial
,,174 frand redress of grievances through the government process. The firm
informed Lagatree that the arbitration agreement was not negotiable.1 75
165. Id. at 137.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 139.
168. See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir.
2002).
169. Id.
170. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 743 (9th Cir. 2003).
171. Id. at 745.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Upon Lagatree's continued refusal to sign the agreement, Luce Forward
withdrew its job offer. 17
6
Lagatree first sued in state court, alleging wrongful termination in
violation of public policy and in violation of the California Unfair Com-
petition Law. 177 The state court held that Luce Forward had lawfully dis-
charged Lagatree.178 The California Court of Appeals affirmed, and the
California Supreme Court denied review. 179
Simultaneous with his lawsuit, Lagatree filed a discrimination
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 180 He al-
leged that he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for his refusal to
sign the arbitration provision.181 The EEOC brought a case in the public
interest and on behalf of Lagatree, arguing that under Duffield, Luce
Forward could not require employees to sign mandatory arbitration
agreements. The EEOC also asserted that Luce Forward's refusal to hire
Lagatree constituted unlawful retaliation for Lagatree's assertion of his
constitutional right to a jury trial under Title VII. 182
In addition to relief for Lagatree, the EEOC sought to permanently
enjoin Luce Forward from engaging in unlawful retaliation and ordered
the firm to "desist from utilizing mandatory arbitration agreements."' 183
The district court granted the injunction on the EEOC's claims for in-
junctive relief under the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Duffield,'8 4 but did
not rule on the EEOC's retaliation theory.1 85
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit heard Luce Forward's ap-
peal and the EEOC's cross-appeal.1 86 In a split decision, the majority
held that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City v.
Adams overruled Duffield by implication.' 87 According to the majority,
Lagatree had not engaged in protected activity by refusing to sign the
agreement because the agreement was not illegal; thus, the panel rejected
the EEOC's theory of illegal retaliation. 188 Judge Pregerson dissented,
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. (discussing Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 745-46.
183. Id. at 746.
184. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1086-93 (C.D. Cal.
2000).
185. Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 746.
186. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2002).
187. Id.
188. Id.
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concluding that Duffield remained good law after Circuit City because
the cases addressed different issues and had compatible holdings. 189
Judge Pregerson emphasized that the issue in Duffield was whether em-
ployers may require their employees to agree to arbitrate Title VII claims
as a mandatory condition of employment. 190 The issue in Circuit City, he
juxtaposed, was whether the FAA excluded employment arbitration
agreements by non-transportation workers. 9 Although the Circuit City
decision did address discrimination, it looked exclusively at state law
claims because the plaintiff had not alleged Title VII claims.' 92 More-
over, Judge Pregerson argued, the United States Supreme Court never
explicitly mentioned Duffield, and accordingly did not explicitly overrule
that decision.193
The Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc and unani-
mously agreed that the panel had erred in holding that Circuit City im-
plicitly overruled Duffield. 194 Nonetheless, the court then explicitly over-
ruled Duffield on the grounds that the case had been wrongly decided. 95
The court found the text of § 118 of the CRA to be unambiguous, and
thus decided that they were precluded from considering its legislative
history. 196
The dissenting opinions argued, however, that Duffield was still
good law and that employees should not be forced to arbitrate statutory
discrimination claims. These opinions consisted of a three-judge partial
concurrence and a partial dissent authored by Judge Pregerson. 197 Judge
Pregerson agreed that Circuit City did not overrule Duffield, but reasoned
that Duffield remained good law because it was based upon a proper
analysis of the legislative history of § 118 of the CRA. 198 "The majority
opinion," Judge Pregerson wrote, "allows employers to force their em-
ployees to choose between their jobs and their right to bring future Title
VII claims in court. That choice is no choice at all."1 99 He cited the
House Committee reports to support his assertion that Congress intended
189. Id. at 1008-09 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1008.
193. Id.
194. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 2003).
195. Id. at 745.
196. Id. at 753 (citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 97 (2003); Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997);
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994)).
197. Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 754.
198. Id. at 754 n.l (Pregerson, J. dissenting).
199. Id. at 754.
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that "American workers should not be forced to choose between their
jobs and their civil rights. 2 °°
As a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Circuit
City and the Ninth Circuit's corresponding opinion in Luce Forward,
American workers faced with mandatory arbitration clauses must do just
what Congress intended to prevent. An employee who experiences dis-
crimination and who has signed a pre-dispute arbitration clause can only
hope that Congress acts to clarify its intent, or that a court will declare
the clause unenforceable.
V. ARE EMPLOYEES FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE?
Against the backdrop of federal case law on the matter, the situation
is rather bleak for employees who are forced to sign arbitration clauses
and later experience discrimination. Although the United States Supreme
Court does not appear poised to reverse course on this matter any time
soon, there are a few glimmers of hope for employees. First, courts have
made two fundamental mistakes regarding the statutory law in question
by failing to recognize the anticipatory retaliation aspect of new hire,
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contracts and by refusing to acknowl-
edge the ambiguity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the resulting need
to inquire into the legislative history when construing the Act. Second,
despite facing an uphill battle, members of Congress embark on an an-
nual attempt to undo the courts' disregard of congressional intent by in-
troducing legislation to prohibit mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in the employment context, as Congress initially intended.
An employee's best hope, however, is in the continued willingness
of lower courts to recognize what the Supreme Court fails to: An em-
ployee forced to choose between her job and her right to sue faces no
meaningful choice at all. Thus, state and federal courts applying state law
will likely continue to find mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
the employment context procedurally unconscionable.
A. Anticipatory Retaliation Is Prohibited by Title VII
Although it may sound like a stretch for a current or prospective
employee to bring a claim under Title VII for unlawful retaliation after
being fired for refusing to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement, this
type of claim should be considered a valid cause of action. In Luce For-
ward and similar cases, a new employee (1) is presented with a manda-
tory arbitration clause requiring arbitration of federal statutory discrimi-
200. Id. at 755 (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 104 (1991)). For a more detailed criticism of
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Luce Forward, see Kent, supra note 9, at 109-10.
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nation claims under Title VII, (2) refuses to sign the employment agree-
ment, and (3) is fired for refusing to do so. The EEOC's creative counsel
argued in Luce Forward that the termination is an unlawful discharge,
which is illegal adverse treatment under the anti-retaliation provision of
Title VII.20 1
The basis for this argument is sound, yet courts have not given the
argument enough credit. 20 2 By the plain language of the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII, when employees use the tools Congress provided
to protect their rights, they are protected from discrimination and adverse
treatment . 3 By affording protection against retaliation, Congress meant
to preserve access to remedial measures in the course of protecting the
employee's statutory rights.20 4 The remedial measures provided under
Title VII for unlawful employment practices include the right to file and
the right to litigate a civil action against one's employer. 20 5 But in addi-
tion to those rights, courts should also consider preserving the right to
file and the right to litigate a civil action against one's employer, specifi-
cally in a court of law, as a protected tool.
The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII "protects an individual
from discrimination and adverse treatment that results from an employee'utiliz[ing] the tools provided by Congress to protect his rights by filing
or litigating a civil action against his employer., 20 6 Thus, if the right to
file a suit in court is a protected tool, the EEOC correctly argued that the
anti-retaliation measures in our nation's anti-discrimination laws provide
protection against such adverse treatment to applicants or employees
who exercise their statutory procedural right to seek judicial redress for
unlawful employment practices.0 7
In contrast, permitting employers to commit adverse employment
actions in response to an employee's refusal to sign a mandatory arbitra-
tion clause provides the employer a tool that Congress did not intend.208
201. Answering Brief/Cross-Opening Brief of EEOC at 10, EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton
& Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 00-57222, 01-5532 1).
202. See Luce Forward, 303 F.3d at 1004-05.
203. EEOC Brief at 21-22, Luce Forward (Nos. 00-57222, 01-55321) (citing Sias v. City
Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) and Garcia v. Lawn, 805 F.2d 1400, 1401
(9th Cir. 1986)).
204. Id. at 13 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
205. Id. at 20 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), (3) (2000)).
206. Id. at 21-22 (citing Sias, 588 F.2d at 695; Garcia, 805 F.2d at 1401).
207. Id. at 22 (citing Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A]nti-
retaliation provision of Title VII 'grants special protection to all employees-regardless of race-
who are subjected to retaliation' for engaging in protected conduct.")). Such protection does not
depend on the viability of the discrimination claim. The "participation clause shields an employee
from retaliation regardless of the merit" of the underlying claim of discrimination. Id. at 22 n.9 (cit-
ing Sias, 588 F.2d at 695).
208. See id. at 25.
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Rather than allowing an employee to reach the point where his or her
actions would be statutorily protected from any retaliatory adverse treat-
ment-the point where that employee has filed or begun to litigate a suit
under Title VII in a court of law-the employer preempts the employee's
opportunity to this unquestionable protection. By denying employment to
any individual who will not waive the right to a judicial forum for resolu-
tion of any future discrimination claims, the employer commits a form of
anticipatory retaliation, in direct conflict with federal law's goal of main-
taining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms 20 9
Employers should not be permitted to retaliate against employees
and prospective employees who wish both to work with the given firm
and preserve their rights to a judicial forum for the resolution of potential
statutory claims. Such a practice conflicts with Congress' goal of main-
taining unimpeded access to statutory remedial mechanisms. The refusal
to sign mandatory arbitration clauses should be considered protected ac-
tivity under federal anti-discrimination statutes.
The anticipatory retaliation issue has not, to date, been raised in
other circuit courts or accepted for review by the United States Supreme
Court. Despite the short shrift given the argument by the Ninth Circuit,
other courts may still resolve the question differently.
B. Mandatory Arbitration Directly Conflicts with
the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Despite several courts' conclusory statements that the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 is clear and unambiguous, more careful scrutiny of the tim-
ing of the drafting and passage of the CRA and its language leads to the
inevitable conclusion that the CRA is ambiguous. The enforcement of
mandatory arbitration clauses directly conflicts with Congress' intent in
passing the CRA. While courts have repeatedly refused to consider Con-
gress' intent because the statute is "clear and unambiguous, 2 10 the pres-
ence of a circuit split, at least until recently, indicates that the statute is
ambiguous, and dissension by unconvinced judges is even more demon-
strative.211
The language in § 118 of the CRA is ambiguous not only because it
addresses arbitration with too much breadth, but also because of the tim-
ing of its drafting (before Gilmer) and adoption (after Gilmer).2 12 Section
118 encourages the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, in-
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001); EEOC v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 753 (9th Cir. 2003).
211. See, e.g., Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 754.
212. See supra notes 120-134 and accompanying text.
Seattle University Law Review
cluding "arbitration," where appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law to resolve disputes arising under the federal anti-discrimination stat-
utes.213 However, arbitration is only one of the ADR methods mentioned.
The others include negotiation, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-
finding, and minitrials.21 4 Of those methods listed other than arbitration,
all are typically used post-dispute, voluntarily, and by agreement of the
parties. Although not conclusive, it is reasonable to presume that arbitra-
tion, used in this list of ADR methods, refers to voluntary, post-dispute
arbitration.
Furthermore, Congress did not explicitly endorse agreements to ar-
bitrate. Rather, Congress endorsed arbitration as an example of the many
ADR methods by which disputing parties may choose to resolve their
claims. Endorsing arbitration as one method of post-dispute resolution is
clearly different from endorsing agreements to arbitrate without regard to
whether the agreement is made pre- or post-dispute. The former is the
position Congress took in the CRA; the latter is the position adopted by
many courts.
Last, the phrase "to the extent authorized by law," is ambiguous.
The CRA of 1991 was written before, yet signed into law after, Gil-
mer.215 Without inquiring into congressional intent, it is impossible to
determine to which version of "law" Congress intended to bind parties.
These ambiguities can only be resolved by inquiry into congressional
intent by courts willing to interpret the law as Congress intended.
Most significantly, when the CRA was implemented, Congress di-
rected courts that "when the statutory terms in [Title VII] are susceptible
to alternative interpretations, courts are to select the construction which
most effectively advances the underlying congressional purpose [of the
Act]., 2 16 To date, few courts have done SO. 2 17
C. Legislative Remedies Face a Tough Battle
California lawmakers proposed a bill that would have prohibited
employers from requiring employees to sign mandatory arbitration
agreements regarding civil rights claims, as a condition of employ-
ment.21 8 California's A.B. 1715 was passed by the State House of Repre-
213. Id.
214.42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
215. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
216. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 88 (1991); accord Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443
(1991) (holding that civil rights statutes should be construed broadly).
217. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2003) (Preger-
son, J., dissenting).
218. A.B. 1715, 2003-2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
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sentatives on May 19, 2003, and by the Senate on August 27, 2003, only
to be vetoed by Governor Gray Davis on October 12, 2003, during a dif-
ficult recall campaign. 21 9 Governor Davis vetoed the bill, citing concerns
that the proposed restrictions would hamper the ability of small busi-
nesses to resolve disputes in a cost-efficient manner. 220 However, he also
stressed that the arbitration system needs to be reformed to ensure fair-
ness and encouraged legislation that would treat employers and employ-
ees equally. 2
Other state legislatures do not appear to be following suit with their
own proposed legislation.222 Thus, employees in California and across
the United States can only look to the United States Congress, mold-
breaking federal courts, and state courts for assistance.
Members of the United States Congress who urged Governor Davis
to support California's A.B. 1715223 proposed broader federal legislation
that would have accomplished the same goal.2 24 Under the Preservation
of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2004, the FAA would have been
amended to exclude such clauses in employment contracts for all work-
ers involved in "commerce., 225 Additionally, under the Act, if a clause
required arbitration of a dispute arising under the federal constitution or
federal law, the clause would have been rendered unenforceable.22 6
The proposed legislation also contained an exception permitting
post-dispute arbitration, if both parties entered into the agreement know-
ingly and voluntarily,22 7 and would not have precluded an employee or
union from enforcing any of the rights or terms of a valid collective bar-
gaining agreement.2 28 In the introductory remarks of the larger Civil
Rights Act of 2004, nicknamed "The Fairness Act," of which this legisla-
tion would have been a part, Senator Kennedy stated that the Act was
intended to "guarantee that victims of discrimination and unfair labor
practices have access to the courts when necessary to enforce their rights
219. Id.
220. Staff Reporters, Davis Vetoes Limits on Mandatory Employment Arbitration Clauses, Oct.
15, 2003, available at http://www.adrworld.com by subscription (copy on file with author).
221. Id.
222. According to a combined source search of the 2003-2004 Bill Tracking databases on
Lexis-Nexis (TRCK 03 and TRCK 04), California's A.B. 1715 appears to be the only recently pro-
posed legislation on point. Search terms and connectors used were the following: "mandatory arbi-
tration" OR "compulsory arbitration" OR "arbitration agree!" AND "employ!"
223. Kucinich, Democratic Leaders Urge Gov. Davis to Support California Law, available at
http://www.commondreams.org/news2003/0905-09.htm (Sept. 5, 2003).
224. Fairness and Individual Rights Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil Rights Act
of 2004, S. 2088, H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004).
225. S. 2088, 108th Cong. § 512 (2004).
226. Id. § 513.
227. Id. § 513 (b)(1).
228. Id. § 513 (b)(2).
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and to obtain effective remedies., 229 Senator Kennedy acknowledged
Congress' lack of clarity in earlier legislation: "Our proposals will
strengthen existing protections, often in cases where the courts have let
us down by adopting unacceptably narrow interpretations of existing
law. , 23
0
Although this proposed legislation furthered the congressional in-
tent at the passage of the CRA of 1991, President George W. Bush and
the Republican majority in both the House and Senate were unlikely to
adopt this or any similar legislation. The sponsorship of the bill was tell-
ing: All twenty-six co-sponsors in the Senate, and 100 of the 101 co-
sponsors in the House are Democrats; the remaining co-sponsor, Repre-
sentative Sanders, is an Independent. 231 After introduction, the bill was
referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pen-
sions232 and to the House Committees on Education and the Workforce,
the Judiciary, and Transportation and Infrastructure, 233 where it seems to
have died a quiet death. This bill appears unlikely to be revived in the
current polarized political climate; even the Clinton-era chair of the
EEOC acknowledged that "[t]he train has left the station on mandatory
arbitration. 234
Coupled with the lack of success of similar, previously introduced
legislation,235 the Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2004
faced a challenging trip through Congress. In the meantime, employees
are forced to sign mandatory arbitration agreements against the express
intent of Congress.236 As the foregoing cases suggest, courts continue to
rely on the FAA and § 118 of the CRA of 1991 to circumvent em-
ployee's statutory rights.237
229. 150 CONG. REC. S 1296 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
230. Id.
231. Congressional Information Service, Inc., Bill Tracking Reports, 2004 Bill Tracking S.
2088 and 2004 Bill Tracking H.R. 3809 (LEXIS through 2004 legislation).
232. 150 CONG. REC. S1296 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
233. 150 CONG REC. H514 (daily ed. Feb. 11,2004) (statement of Rep. Lewis).
234. Nancy Montweiler, EEOC: Ex-EEOC Chairwoman Expresses Concern over Agency
Direction in Bush Administration, DAILY LAB. REP., Aug. 23, 2001, at 163.
235. The Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2004 is the third major attempt by
legislators to address this issue. Neither the 2001 nor 2002 versions of the Act were passed. Both of
the earlier attempts have languished in committee. See Congressional Information Service, Inc., Bill
Tracking Reports, 2001 Bill Tracking H.R. 2282 and 2002 Bill Tracking S. 2435 (LEXIS through
2002 legislation).
236. See supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
that invalid limitation on punitive damages can be severed and remainder of arbitration agreement
enforced); Farac v. Permanente Med. Group, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046-47 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (re-
jecting plaintiffs unconscionability arguments and compelling arbitration).
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D. The Employee's Best Hope. State Court Defenses to
Arbitration Clauses
Once contracts are formed, courts apply state law principles of con-
tract formation to determine the validity of agreements to arbitrate. 38
According to the United States Supreme Court, general state law contract
defenses such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability may invalidate ar-
bitration agreements.23 9 Although case law surrounding the arbitrability
of statutory claims in the employment context is voluminous, the Su-
preme Court has addressed challenges to arbitration clauses on the
grounds of unconscionability only four times. 240 And while the Ninth
Circuit has busily applied the doctrine to the various Circuit City arbitra-
tion clauses,24' the Supreme Court, so far, has chosen not to review the
Ninth Circuit's findings of unconscionability. 242
Even with these available defenses, plaintiffs must overcome sub-
stantial obstacles to prove that an arbitration agreement is invalid on con-
tract law grounds, and few plaintiffs succeed.243 Despite these obstacles,
plaintiff successes on claims of unconscionability are on the rise, 244 per-
238. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1955).
239. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
240. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 681 (finding that state law rendering contract arbitration
clauses unenforceable was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros
v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995) (holding arbitration clause enforceable, despite its
requirement to litigate in a distant forum at an increased cost); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491
(1987) (ruling that Federal Arbitration Act preempts a Califomia statute permitting judicial action
despite existence of an arbitration agreement); Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 440 (1953) (holding
that the right to select judicial forum is a provision that cannot validly be waived, and agreement to
arbitrate is unconscionable and invalidated by the Securities Act's express provisions against
waiver), overruled by Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 485
(1989) (finding that, without discussing unconscionability, arbitration clause was valid because
arbitration did not affect the substantive provisions of the Securities Act and was merely a proce-
dural remedy).
241. See AI-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254, 1256 (2005); Ingle v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1169 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004); Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1104 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004); Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 891 (2002), cert, denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002) (all holding arbitration
agreement unconscionable).
242. See, e.g., Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1165, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004); Mantor, 335 F.3d at
1101, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004); Adams, 279 F.3d at 889, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112
(2002).
243. 7-29 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.4 (2004) (citing, among others, Tjart v. Smith Barney,
Inc., 107 Wash. App. 885, 28 P.3d 823 (2001)). Plaintiffs appear more likely to succeed on the
grounds that (1) requiring arbitration of their dispute would be against public policy, especially when
there is a health and/or safety concern, or (2) their contract is outside the reach of the FAA. See, e.g.,
Young v. Ferrellgas, 106 Wash. App. 524, 531, 21 P.3d 334, 337 (2001).
244. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscion-
ability, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 185, 186-87 (2004). In her research, Randall found that judges hold
arbitration agreements unconscionable at twice the rate of non-arbitration agreements; that they find
Seattle University Law Review
haps evidence of judicial resistance to the enforcement of unconscion-
able arbitration agreements.
Unconscionability and other contract defenses litigated under state
law appear to be the plaintiffs best hope to avoid arbitration, at least un-
til legislative action or judicial fiat remedy the situation. State courts
have repeatedly expressed concern over allowing employment contract
provisions to replace statutory causes of action. In one notable example,
Young v. Ferrellgas,245 the Washington State Court of Appeals held that
it would be against public policy to enforce a mandatory arbitration
agreement to resolve a statutory overtime wage claim in a non-FAA
transportation employee case.246 This case, although distinguishable in
many ways from the other case law studied in this Comment, provides a
unique perspective on such clauses and agreements. The Young court's
introduction to the arbitration presumption is merely that "Washington
has long favored arbitration of employment disputes ... [b]ut there is a
strong, countervailing, public policy against wrongful discharge. '247
More recent enunciations of the arbitration presumption in the FAA con-
text, inspired by the long line of federal decisions discussed above, tips
the scale toward the federal policy in favor of arbitration, and plaintiffs
appear to face a more difficult challenge when the presumption is framed
in the more recent fashion. Young is one of the few instances where the
court applied the law, in concert with considerations of common sense
and public policy, to determine the enforceability of a clause purporting
to require arbitration of statutory claims.
In Young, the court first determined that the plaintiff, a whistle-
blower, was not obligated to arbitrate his wrongful discharge claim be-
cause such a requirement would be against public policy.2 48 The court
went on to hold that the plaintiffs overtime wage claims, brought under
the Washington State Minimum Wage Act, were not subject to arbitra-
tion based on broad public policy principles.249 If the employer failed to
pay overtime as required by the Revised Code of Washington, "it contra-
vened a substantive, nonnegotiable, statutorily-guaranteed right., 250 The
specific features of such agreements unconscionable when they do not find them to be so in non-
arbitration agreements; and that unconscionability cases have increased with the increased use of
arbitration agreements. Id. Randall also determined that, in the cases she reviewed, judges deemed
50.3% of the arbitration agreements unconscionable, double the rate of 25.6% for other types of
contracts. Id. at 194. Twenty years ago, courts held that agreements were unconscionable at a rate of
12.5% for arbitration agreements and 15.2% for other types of contracts. Id. at 196.
245. 106 Wash. App. 524, 21 P.3d 334 (2001).
246. Id. at 532, 21 P.3d at 338.
247. Id. at 528, 21 P.3d at 336.
248. Id. at 531, 21 P.3d at 337.
249. Id. at 532, 21 P.3d at 337-38.
250. Id. at 531, 21 P.3d at 337.
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court added, "Allowing an arbitration provision to replace this statutory
cause of action would thwart public policy guaranteeing fair wages, codi-
11251fied by our Legislature.
Shortly after Young, the Washington Court of Appeals reviewed a
sexual discrimination claim filed by a stockbroker but was not persuaded
by a public policy argument when made in the context of a discrimina-
tion case.252 In Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., the stockbroker brought sex
discrimination claims under state law and Title VII and, like the plaintiff
in Young, included arguments based upon public policy.25 3 The court dis-
tinguished Tjart from Young on two grounds: Young was not an FAA
case and Young was a whistleblower case involving workplace health
25and safety issues. 4 The Tjart court made no mention of the Young
court's analysis of the overtime wage claim, despite the fact that the
overtime wage claim had no effect on workplace health or safety. Be-
cause of this apparently illusory distinction, the Tjart court's reasoning is
less than satisfying. A whistleblower with a wrongful discharge claim
not subject to the FAA may be a different case than a stockbroker with a
sexual harassment claim subject to the FAA.255 However, the difference
between a plaintiff with a statutory overtime wage claim, and a plaintiff
with a statutory sexual harassment claim seems much smaller. If Young
was entitled to litigate his overtime wage claim in a judicial forum on
principles of public policy, Tjart should also have been entitled to litigate
her statutory sexual harassment claim on principles of public policy.
251. Id. at 532, 21 P.3d at 337-38.
252. Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 107 Wash. App. 885,899, 28 P.3d 823, 831 (2001).
253. Id. at 896-901, 28 P.3d at 829-32.
254. Id. at 900, 28 P.3d at 831.
255. This is, of course, setting aside the argument that employees who report employment
discrimination should be treated in parity with employees traditionally thought of as whistleblowers
in the public health and safety arena; an argument destined to gain momentum after the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, No. 02-1672, 2005 U.S.
LEXIS 2928 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2005). In Jackson, the Court held that the private right of action implied
by Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation, including protection for school employees who make
complaints about sex discrimination. Id. at *14. Although not specifically framed as a whistleblower
case, the Court reasoned that a teacher "would have no recourse if [he or she] were subsequently
fired for speaking out [about sexual discrimination]. Without protection from retaliation, individuals
who witness discrimination would likely not report it ... and the underlying discrimination would
go unremedied." Id. at *26. In the wake of Jackson, we can expect increased scrutiny of the courts'
disparate treatment of discrimination whistleblowers and health and safety whistleblowers, who may
be less likely to be forced into arbitration. See, e.g., Young v. Ferrellgas, 106 Wash. App. 524, 21
P.3d 334 (2001); see also, e.g., Brunderidge v. Fluor Fed. Servs., 109 Wash. App. 347, 356, 35 P.3d
389, 394 (2001) (holding that the FAA did not require arbitration of pipe fitters' claim of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy); Wilson v. City of Monroe, 88 Wash. App. 113, 116, 943
P.2d 1134, 1135 (1997) (holding that a whistleblower was not required to exhaust the remedies in a
collective bargaining agreement arbitration clause, and that "[t]he right to be free from wrongful
termination in contravention of public policy is independent of any underlying contractual agreement
between employee and employer").
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E. Unconscionability: An Opportunity for State Courts to
Apply the Law and Common Sense
Although the United States Supreme Court has said that state laws
that are hostile to arbitration cannot be enforced,2 56 state law is still the
grounds for determining if a particular arbitration clause may be en-
forced.257
Volition is the essence of a contract, and recognizes the "free exer-
cise of will by parties who are on a relatively equal economic footing and
who are brought together in the dynamic market place by their needs and
desires. 25 8 When one party has an overwhelming ability to dictate the
terms of a contract to the detriment of the weaker party, the essence of
the contract is undermined. 259 This idea is the basis of the unconscion-
ability doctrine. First-year law students learn the doctrine through Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors.26 °
On its face, the unconscionability doctrine seems clearly applicable
to a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause in an employment contract,
whether the clause is presented prior to the beginning of employment or
as a condition to continued employment. First, there is a gross inequality
of bargaining positions between the employer and employee, except in
situations involving the most highly sought after, specialized employees.
Second, while the employer may have a pile of resumes stacked halfway
to the ceiling for one open position, the employee most likely has only
one offer in hand and little, if any, negotiating power. Because an in-
creasing number of employers require arbitration agreements as a condi-
tion of employment,2 6' it is less likely that the employee or job seeker
256. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
257. Tart, 107 Wash. App. at 885, 28 P.3d at 823.
258. 1-6 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 96 (2001).
259. Id.
260. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 75 (N.J. 1960). In that case, a buyer
contracted to purchase a new car, and the standard form purchase agreement featured an express
warranty from the manufacturer for replacement of defective parts that purported to disclaim all
other warranties, express or implied. Id. The buyer brought an action for breach of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability, which the seller defended against by arguing the disclaimer of other war-
ranties, and that the buyer had a duty to read and understand the contracts he signs. Id. The court
recognized the "gross inequality" of bargaining position between the buyer and seller in this situa-
tion. Id at 87. The fact that virtually all American automobile manufacturers subjected consumers to
the same standard form contract, with no bargaining, in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion, indicated that
there was no competition among auto manufacturers regarding the warranty term. Id. Accordingly,
the buyer was forced to choose between signing a contract that removed the fundamental protection
of the U.C.C.'s implied warranty of merchantability and not purchasing a product "material to his
economic well-being." 1-6 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 96(a)(1) (2001). The court held the contract
invalid, focusing upon the lack of meaningful choice by the purchaser when faced with a Hobson's
choice. See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 102.
261. This is evidenced by the increased litigation regarding such clauses. A LEXIS search of
all state and federal cases for the search terms "(mandatory OR compulsory) s ("arbitration clause"
[Vol. 28:467
2005] Mandatory Arbitration of Title VII Employment Claims 841
would be able to obtain offers with competition among employers on the
arbitration term. Rather, such clauses are typically presented in a take-it-
or-leave-it fashion as part of standard form contracts. Here, rather than
facing a Hobson's choice regarding the purchase or absence of a product,
the employee or job seeker must choose between two factors critical to
her economic well-being: new or continued employment and the right to
sue in a court of law should an actionable employment dispute arise.
Despite the apparently natural fit of the unconscionability doctrine,
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the employment context
are not typically considered unconscionable contracts of adhesion merely
because of unequal bargaining power.2 62 Courts have developed a wide-
ranging set of rules for determining whether contracts are unconscion-
able, ranging from multi-element tests to vague parameters resembling
the proverbial "smell test.' '263 Some courts have also required various
combinations of substantive and/or procedural unconscionability in order
to void a contract.264
In Circuit City, for example, the Ninth Circuit on remand deter-
mined that the mandatory arbitration clause at issue was unconscionable
under California law. 265 Other circuits have followed, holding similar
clauses procedurally and substantively unconscionable under their re-
spective state laws.266 State courts, meanwhile, are busy outlining their
own approaches to unconscionability, some in ways that appear to pre-
serve judicial skepticism as to whether employees volitionally agree to
such contract clauses. Typically, courts break the analysis into two parts:
OR "arbitration agreement") AND employment" resulted in a total of 834 documents, with 551 of
them dated after Jan. 1, 1995. Considered in two-year increments, the cases since then show a slow,
but steady, increase in litigation of these clauses, from a two-year low of 58 in 1995 and 1997 to a
high of 156 cases from Jan. 1, 2003 to Mar. 4, 2005.
262. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). But see Ingle
v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2003).
263. See, e.g., Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 850 (10th Cir. 1986) (suggest-
ing a seven-element test); Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906-07 (Kan. 1976)
(recommending a ten-element test); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (1969) (ac-
knowledging that finding unconscionability exists under specific facts is substantially easier than
explaining the doctrine).
264. See, e.g., Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1170; Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1105
(9th Cir. 2003) (requiring both procedural and substantive elements, not necessarily present in the
same degree, to find a contract unconscionable); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 781-82
(Wash. 2004) (noting that federal courts have interpreted Washington law to require a showing of
either procedural or substantive unconscionability; holding that substantive unconscionability alone
can support a finding of unconscionability but passing on the question of whether procedural uncon-
scionability will suffice); Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Gatlin, 848 So. 2d 828, 845 (Miss. 2003) (requir-
ing only procedural unconscionability).
265. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002).
266. See, e.g., Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1165; Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, 341 F.3d 256, 266-67 (3d
Cir. 2003).
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(1) substantive unconscionability (terms that are overly harsh, particu-
larly one-sided, or outrageously unfair) and (2) procedural unconscion-
ability (the absence of meaningful choice). 267 Many courts have applied
the substantive unconscionability analysis to specific provisions of arbi-
tration agreements such as fee-splitting provisions and time bars shorter
than the statute of limitation.26 8 However, courts have frequently con-
cluded that such mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses are not proce-
durally unconscionable; first, because they are not procedurally uncon-
scionable on their face, and second, because there is usually insufficient
evidence of external circumstances to prove that the manner in which the
contract was entered was procedurally unconscionable.26 9
Two cases recently decided as companion cases by the Washington
Supreme Court indicate that the court will seriously consider the factors
surrounding the formation of the contract, when making the unconscion-
ability determination, rather than just reciting that such clauses are not
per se procedurally unconscionable. 270
In Zuver v. Airtouch Communications, the plaintiff signed an arbi-
tration agreement containing a waiver of a judicial forum for statutory
and other claims about fifteen days after she accepted employment as a
sales support representative. 27 The plaintiff had a preexisting medical
condition that worsened and, although her employer made accommoda-
tions for her condition, she still required medical leave. She was fired
nine months later.272 The plaintiff filed suit alleging a violation of the
Washington Law Against Discrimination.27 3 Initially, the defendant
274company did not mention arbitration in its answer, but when the plain-
tiff requested a copy of her personnel files, the company learned of the
arbitration agreement and moved to compel arbitration.2 75
In Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, after three years of employment, the
plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement as a condition to his continued
employment. 276 After being injured on the job and filing claims with the
Department of Labor and Industries, the plaintiff was fired for an "inabil-
267. See Adler, 103 P.3d at 781.
268. See, e.g., id.; Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
269. See Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 107 Wash. App. 885, 898-99, 28 P.3d 823, 830 (2001)
(finding an arbitration clause not procedurally unconscionable where the employee had a "reason-
able opportunity to understand that she was agreeing to arbitrate her future statutory claims, and the
arbitration provision was obvious in the fairly short contract").
270. Adler, 103 P.3d at 773; Zuver v. Airtouch Commun., Inc., 103 P.3d 753 (Wash. 2004).
271. 103 P.3d at 757.
272. Id. at 758.
273. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (1999).
274. Zuver, 103 P.3d at 759.
275. Id.
276, 103 P.3d at 778.
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ity to operate all aspects of [the] maintenance department., 27 7 After
EEOC mediation, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging a violation of the
Washington Law Against Discrimination. The company subsequently
moved to compel arbitration.2 78
Treating the two as companion cases to be resolved by similar law,
the Washington Supreme Court laid out Washington's approach to de-
termining the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements in the
employment context. The court recognized the two categories of uncon-
scionability-substantive and procedural-and articulated definitions
that are consistent with the previously discussed doctrine of unconscion-
ability.279 Substantive unconscionability in Washington concerns contract
clauses that are one-sided or overly harsh or "shocking to the con-
science., 280 Procedural unconscionability denotes "the lack of meaning-
ful choice, considering all the circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion,"2 8 ' including the manner in which the contract was entered,"whether the party had 'a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms
of the contract,' and whether 'the important terms [were] hidden in a
maze of fine print."' 282 In making a procedural unconscionability deter-
mination, the court said that "these three factors [should] not be applied
mechanically without regard to whether, in truth, a meaningful choice
existed. 28 3
The Association of Washington Business, as amicus curiae for the
defendant, argued that the majority of courts require proof of both sub-
stantive and procedural unconscionability in order to void a contract on
the basis of unconscionability. 284 It argued that despite even grossly un-
equal bargaining power and other evidence of lack of meaningful choice,
there is no injury to the weaker party if the terms of the contract are
"fair." 285
The Washington Supreme Court instead agreed with precedent
from the Arizona Supreme Court and other courts 286 that unconscionabil-
ity can be proven by showing substantive unconscionability alone.287 The
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 781.
280. Id. (citations omitted).
281. Id.
282. Id. (citations omitted).
283. Id. (emphasis added).
284. Id. at 782.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. See also AI-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 2005)
(citing Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 107 Wash. App. 885, 898, 28 P.3d 823, 830 (2001) (applying
Washington law to continued conflicts over the enforceability of the Circuit City arbitration agree-
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question remains, however, whether procedural unconscionability alone
can render a contract void.288
Despite the unanswered question, the outcome of the Washington
cases represents a minor success both for businesses wishing to use arbi-
tration agreements and employees bound by them. From the employer
perspective, courts will generally sever the unconscionable provisions289
and compel arbitration without the unconscionable provisions. 29° Em-
ployees benefit when courts sever provisions that are deemed uncon-
scionable, such as those dictating fee-splitting provisions, non-mutual
commitments to arbitrate, time-based limitations on actions that are far
shorter than comparable statutes of limitation, and other similarly objec-
tionable clauses.29' While these protections against the enforcement of
unconscionable clauses certainly represent steps in the right direction,
employees are still subject to the process of arbitration, which is arguably
an inequitable method of dispute resolution as discussed in this Comment
and by many other commentators.292
The remaining question is whether courts will find that procedural
unconscionability alone can support a finding of unconscionability. 293 In
the unanimous Adler opinion, Justice Bridge stated that "if [the em-
ployer's] representative threatened to fire [the plaintiff] for refusing to
sign the agreement, despite the fact that Adler raised concerns with its
terms or indicated a lack of understanding, the manner of the transaction
would lend support to Adler's claim of procedural unconscionability. 294
If the employer, on the other hand, "explained the document and/or of-
fered to answer Adler's concerns or questions," those facts would work
against Adler's claim of procedural unconscionability. 295 The court re-
ment, the Ninth Circuit stated that "a contract generally may be invalid based on either substantive
or procedural unconscionability," but acknowledged the Washington Court of Appeals' failure to
address the question of whether, in the employment context, procedural unconscionability alone will
support an unconscionability claim).
288. Neither the Arizona Supreme Court nor the Washington Supreme Court has addressed the
question. Adler, 103 P.3d at 782.
289. See id. at 787.
290. See, e.g., Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that invalid limitation on punitive damages can be severed and the remainder of the arbitration
agreement can be enforced).
291. See, e.g., Adler, 103 P.3d at 786-88 (finding an attorneys' fees provision and a substan-
tially shorter statute of limitation than that provided under statutory law (180 days vs. 3 years) to be
unconscionable).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 791.
294. Id. at 784. Justice Madsen concurred, emphasizing that an employee's disagreement with
the terms of an arbitration agreement in the employment context is insufficient to invalidate that
agreement under Ninth Circuit and United States Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 791.
295. Id. at 791.
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manded the case to the trial court to allow the plaintiff to prove his claim
of procedural unconscionability. 296 Significantly, although mentioned in
a footnote, the court stated that, given the facts of the case, a finding of
procedural unconscionability would "necessarily lead to a finding that
Adler's waiver of his right to a jury was not 'knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent,"' and thus, the waiver would be void.297
One cannot rush to predict the effect of these carefully chosen
words. In fact, it is still uncertain whether an arbitration clause will be
found void because an employer threatens to fire an employee or because
employment is conditioned upon the signing of an arbitration agreement;
that uncertainty remains even if these acts are coupled with an objection
by the employee because of his or her lack of understanding. But while
Adler does not open the door to a finding of unconscionability for all
plaintiffs who are forced to choose between their jobs and their right to
sue, Adler does acknowledge that even jurists who firmly enforce federal
policy favoring arbitration recognize that there are employees for whom,
in truth, there is no meaningful choice when presented with an arbitration
agreement.
Given the complexities inherent in evaluating the extent to which
each individual employee has a meaningful choice in signing a manda-
tory arbitration contract, the following questions remain: How much is
too much of a threat, and how little is too little understanding? And if
procedural unconscionability can be established in Adler and cases like
it, what does this mean for other employees forced to sign arbitration
clauses they do not understand? Finally, what, in truth, distinguishes the
case of a sympathetic plaintiff forced to choose between his job and his
right to sue and the potentially millions of Americans forced to make the
same decision based upon "cripplingly imperfect information? '"2 98
Information inequity or a total absence of real information in de-
termining whether to sign an arbitration agreement negates meaningful
choice as much as a lack of understanding of the contract. In the con-
sumer context,
[t]he paradigm of the consumer or buyer who is aware of material,
risk-shifting provisions over which he has no bargaining power is
extremely rare. The sad reality is that the typical consumer does not
296. Id. at 784. The plaintiff in Adler emigrated to the United States from Poland in 1990. Id.
When the company filed a motion to compel to enforce the arbitration agreement, Adler responded
that he did not understand the agreement and was not given a copy of the document. He requested
that the court declare the agreement unconscionable. Nonetheless, the court granted the company's
motion to compel without a hearing. Id. at 779.
297. Id. at 784 n.9.
298. Bodie, supra note 10, at 8.
Seattle University Law Review
have the foggiest notion of such provisions, but signs what the
salesperson refers to as the "standard form," though the salesperson
is equally ignorant of the import of the boilerplate provisions.
299
The same can be said of uninformed employees agreeing to arbitra-
tion clauses in employment contracts.
Although critics of mandatory arbitration in the employment con-
text often point to the power imbalance between the parties,30 0 until re
cently, few have done enough research to quantify the problem. Some
scholars have suggested that post-dispute agreements to arbitrate em-
ployment claims may be economically efficient, given certain caveats.301
In the post-dispute setting, the parties should know the exact nature of
the dispute and the potential legal claims, permitting them to perform an
adequate cost-benefit analysis to determine whether a judicial or arbitral
forum is the better method of dispute resolution. In the pre-dispute set-
ting, however, numerous predictions are required to determine the num-
ber and likelihood of potential claims, and to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of the offered (or current) job and a different job.30 2 Compared
with post-dispute information, predictions made pre-dispute "border on
fantasy. 30 3
Employees facing the decision of whether to sign a pre-dispute ar-
bitration agreement are forced to assent or decline without adequate in-
formation regarding the importance of their decision. They may face
threats and ultimatums by employers, or they may possess too little in-
formation to truly understand the decision they are being forced to make.
As more and more cases like Adler emerge, courts must evaluate whether
an employee can truly "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" assent
to a contract clause when they have no real understanding of the clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
Contemporary courts, with few exceptions, have ignored the fact
that employment contracts are not commercial contracts or collective
bargaining agreements. An employee suffering discrimination or retalia-
tion because of a refusal to sign an arbitration clause faces far different
stakes than a consumer or an employee who is a party to a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Congress' long-standing intent to provide a public,
299. 1-6 MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 96 (2001).
300. See, e.g., Nicole Karas, EEOC v. Luce and the Mandatory Arbitration Agreement, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 67, 107 (2003); Eric A. Hernandez, Mandatory Arbitration and Employment Dis-
crimination: The Unfair Law, 2 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 96, 100 (2001).
301. Bodie, supra note I0, at 18.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 23.
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judicial forum for Title VII claims should again be made a part of our
law, whether through judicial decisions that accurately interpret congres-
sional intent or through Congress' adoption of an amended Civil Rights
Act.
Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit and state courts appear poised to con-
tinue to refuse to enforce mandatory employment clauses on state law
grounds, including the unconscionability doctrine.3 °4 When considering
future mandatory arbitration cases, the Ninth Circuit and other courts
may wish to listen to an often ignored segment of our society: the United
States Congress. "While conformity to a current of opinion is certainly a
more comfortable position, there is nothing 'ignominious' about standing
alone where, as here, one is right and the majority-as sometimes hap-
pens-is wrong."30
5
304. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
305. Brief of Amici Curiae Representatives George Miller, Barney Frank, Dennis J. Kucinich,
John Coyers, Jr,, Robert E. Andrews, and Other Members of the United States House of Representa-
tives in Support of En Banc Rehearing and Reversal of Luce Forward Panel Decision at 12, EEOC v.
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 00-57222, 01-57221).
